Quantum operations teams will use AI assistants to search runbooks, summarize incidents, draft RCA notes, inspect telemetry, and explain platform behavior. This is useful. It is also risky. Operator copilots must not become silent control planes.
NIST AI RMF provides a framework for managing AI system risks [R219]. OWASP’s LLM security work identifies risks such as prompt injection, insecure output handling, sensitive information disclosure, and supply-chain vulnerabilities [R220]. Quantum operator copilots need both risk framing and concrete controls.
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Operator[Operator] --> Copilot[Operator copilot]
Copilot --> Retrieval[Knowledge retrieval]
Retrieval --> Sources[Runbooks, incidents, docs, evidence]
Copilot --> Advice[Recommendation]
Advice --> Human[Human decision]
Human --> Action[Controlled action]Copilot boundaries
A copilot can retrieve, summarize, compare, and propose. It should not directly change calibration, submit high-cost jobs, rotate secrets, publish claims, or approve evidence without explicit human action.
View diagram source
flowchart TB
Copilot[Copilot capability] --> Read[Read-only retrieval]
Copilot --> Explain[Explain telemetry]
Copilot --> Draft[Draft runbook steps]
Copilot --> Suggest[Suggest next action]
Copilot -. no direct control .-> Calibrate[Change calibration]
Copilot -. no direct control .-> Submit[Submit QPU jobs]
Copilot -. no direct control .-> Approve[Approve claims]Retrieval architecture
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Query[Operator query] --> Classifier[Intent and sensitivity classifier]
Classifier --> Retriever[Retriever]
Retriever --> KB[Knowledge base]
Retriever --> Evidence[Evidence store]
Retriever --> Incidents[Incident archive]
Retriever --> Telemetry[Telemetry summaries]
Retriever --> Context[Grounded context]
Context --> Model[LLM]
Model --> Answer[Answer with citations]The copilot should cite the runbook, evidence package, or incident record used to answer. Unsupported answers should be labeled as suggestions, not facts.
Prompt injection path
View diagram source
flowchart TB
ExternalDoc[External document] --> Retriever[Retriever]
Retriever --> Prompt[Prompt context]
Prompt --> Model[Model]
Model --> ToolCall[Tool call suggestion]
ToolCall --> Risk[Prompt injection risk]
Risk --> Guard[Policy and human approval]A malicious or stale document may instruct the assistant to ignore policy, disclose secrets, or alter output. The retrieval layer should treat content as data, not authority.
Tool use levels
| Level | Capability | Required control |
|---|---|---|
| L0 | answer questions | citations and disclaimers |
| L1 | draft commands | no execution |
| L2 | execute read-only queries | scoped read token |
| L3 | propose write action | human approval plus policy gate |
| L4 | execute routine write action | narrow automation contract |
| L5 | autonomous remediation | only for pre-approved reversible actions |
View diagram source
stateDiagram-v2
[*] --> ReadOnly
ReadOnly --> DraftAction
DraftAction --> ProposedWrite
ProposedWrite --> ApprovedWrite
ApprovedWrite --> AutomatedRoutine
AutomatedRoutine --> AutonomousLimitedMost quantum operations copilots should remain at L0 through L3 until the platform has strong evidence, replay, rollback, and audit controls.
Evaluation suite
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Eval[Copilot evaluation] --> Grounding[Grounding tests]
Eval --> Safety[Safety tests]
Eval --> Secrecy[Secret leakage tests]
Eval --> Action[Action correctness tests]
Eval --> Drift[Knowledge freshness tests]
Eval --> Regression[Regression suite]Evaluation prompts should include stale calibration incidents, ambiguous provider errors, misleading benchmark claims, malicious runbook content, and high-cost job requests.
Human factors
A copilot can increase operator load if it produces confident noise.
View diagram source
flowchart TB
Alert[Platform alert] --> Copilot[Copilot summary]
Copilot --> Operator{Operator trusts?}
Operator -- calibrated trust --> Correct[Appropriate action]
Operator -- overtrust --> Unsafe[Unsafe action]
Operator -- distrust --> Ignored[Useful advice ignored]The goal is calibrated trust. The assistant should expose uncertainty, cite evidence, and preserve the human review path.