Quantum platforms need reviewers that are not the same people who built the benchmark, chose the target, tuned the mitigation, and wrote the claim. Third-party verification does not make a result true, but it reduces the risk of selective reporting, hidden assumptions, and unreviewed drift.
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Claim[Quantum claim] --> Evidence[Evidence package]
Evidence --> Witness[Independent witness]
Witness --> Review[Verification review]
Review --> Outcome[Accept, qualify, or reject]Verification roles
| Role | Function |
|---|---|
| benchmark owner | defines benchmark intent and scoring |
| platform operator | runs workload and preserves evidence |
| provider | supplies backend and operational facts |
| witness | observes or independently verifies execution |
| auditor | checks process and controls |
| scientific reviewer | checks inference and claim strength |
| customer representative | validates business relevance |
View diagram source
mindmap
root((Verification ecosystem))
Benchmark owner
Platform operator
Provider
Witness
Auditor
Scientific reviewer
Customer representativeWitnessable events
View diagram source
flowchart TB
Witness[Witnessable events] --> Spec[Spec freeze]
Witness --> Target[Target snapshot]
Witness --> Compile[Compile profile]
Witness --> Execution[Execution start and end]
Witness --> Calibration[Calibration epoch]
Witness --> Raw[Raw result capture]
Witness --> Claim[Claim review]A witness does not need to see everything. The point is to observe the events that would otherwise be easiest to manipulate after the fact.
Benchmark witness protocol
View diagram source
sequenceDiagram
participant Owner
participant Operator
participant Witness
participant Evidence
Owner->>Evidence: Freeze benchmark specification
Witness->>Evidence: Sign spec hash
Operator->>Evidence: Attach target snapshot
Operator->>Evidence: Attach compile and runtime profile
Witness->>Evidence: Sign execution window
Operator->>Evidence: Attach raw and aggregate results
Witness->>Evidence: Sign completeness statementThe witness should sign hashes of artifacts, not necessarily copy every artifact. This supports confidential review while preserving integrity.
Audit dimensions
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Audit[Audit] --> Process[Process]
Audit --> Evidence[Evidence]
Audit --> Statistics[Statistics]
Audit --> Security[Security]
Audit --> Claims[Claims]| Dimension | Questions |
|---|---|
| process | Was the review path followed? |
| evidence | Are artifacts complete and immutable? |
| statistics | Are uncertainty, selection, and failures disclosed? |
| security | Were credentials, access, and custody controlled? |
| claims | Does the wording match the evidence? |
Anti-gaming controls
View diagram source
flowchart TB
Gaming[Benchmark gaming] --> Cherry[Cherry-picking runs]
Gaming --> Target[Target selection bias]
Gaming --> Mitigation[Undisclosed mitigation]
Gaming --> Drift[Hidden calibration drift]
Gaming --> Posthoc[Post-hoc metric changes]
Cherry --> Controls[Controls]
Target --> Controls
Mitigation --> Controls
Drift --> Controls
Posthoc --> ControlsControls include pre-registered benchmarks, locked scoring code, target selection rules, failure reporting, witness signatures, independent reruns, and public limitation statements.
Audit trail
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Spec[Spec hash] --> Target[Target hash]
Target --> Compile[Compiler hash]
Compile --> Runtime[Runtime profile]
Runtime --> Results[Result hashes]
Results --> Review[Review decision]A good audit trail is boring: hashes, timestamps, identities, target identifiers, calibration epochs, runtime parameters, access logs, and reviewer decisions.
Verification outcomes
View diagram source
stateDiagram-v2
[*] --> Submitted
Submitted --> Verified
Submitted --> Qualified
Submitted --> Rejected
Qualified --> Revised
Revised --> Submitted
Rejected --> Retired| Outcome | Meaning |
|---|---|
| verified | evidence supports the stated claim |
| qualified | evidence supports a narrower claim |
| rejected | evidence does not support the claim |
| deferred | missing artifacts prevent decision |
| retired | claim is obsolete or superseded |
Operational rule
Do not make external quantum-performance claims without independent evidence review proportional to the importance of the claim.
View diagram source
flowchart LR
Importance[Claim importance] --> ReviewDepth[Review depth]
ReviewDepth --> Witness[Witness or audit]
Witness --> Claim[External claim]